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Application of international law in Antarctica is so very complex and unworkable that the 
expert legal commentators assert with confidence that there are no real solutions in the law to 
provide. It is in this legal climate that this paper discusses the legal rights of different parties, 
should mining activity begin in the Antarctic. It will outline the legal rights and implications for 
the different parties who could be involved in mining activities in the future. In 1972 a member 
at the meeting of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties is reported to have said, ‘This Treaty will 
last till a big mineral discovery is made – then it will be every man for himself.’1
 
The right to mine in Antarctica is intricately tied to international law. As the different 
states in Antarctica have differing and disputed status under international law, the legality of 
mining becomes complicated. The “frozen” claims, while practicable in terms of running a 
harmonious system, leaves a lot to be desired for legal clarity, as the legal status of the maritime 
area is subject to a multitude of different interpretations. The over lapping claims of Argentina, 
Chile and United Kingdom, and the unclaimed area of Marie Byrd Land Only adds to the 
difficulty of applying the typical international rules to the Antarctic.     
 
The seven Antarctic claimant states are party to UNCLOS. The United States helped 
draft the Convention, but has not signed it. The US has not made a claim in Antarctica, however, 
and in the event of the claims being tried, the US could feasibly attempt claim the entire 
continent, as could Russia. The rights of these parties will be discussed in a later section. The 
rights and duties surrounding the mining of the deep seabed will also be discussed in later 
paragraphs, but the question of whether the law of the sea zoning is applicable in Antarctica must 




The potential for hydrocarbons in the Antarctic is the resource interest driving the 
creation of this paper. In 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Environment declared that 
humankind was having a devastating impact on the environment. It also announced that the 
world may be running out of easily accessible non-renewable resources. The Organisation of 
                                                 
1 Keith Suter, Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage? (1991, Pluto Press Australia, 
New South Wales) 47. 
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Petroleum Exporting Companies was formed in the 1960s to safeguard oil prices. In 1973 OPEC 
increased the price of oil. This led to much political unrest and international conflict involving 
the Middle East such as Iran and Iraq, Israel and Western nations such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom found oil reserves in the North Sea and became 
largely independent from the Middle East oil reserves by 1980. In 1983 the world leaders 
declared that non-renewable resources were not running out as fast as was previously feared.  
 
There is no substantive proof available, but it is likely Antarctica has vast natural 
resources. Two hundred million years ago in the Mezoic age, the fossil fuels that are exploited 
today were forming. At this time Antarctica was part of Gondwanaland and these resources can 
thus be expected in Antarctica as they are extracted from the super-continents’ other 
components, today’s Australia, Africa and South America. 
 
There are huge logistical barriers which make mining in the Antarctic very unlikely for 
some time, especially on and very close to the continent itself. There is currently no proof of 
sufficiently large and accessible deposits in the Antarctic. Evidence of hydrocarbons in the 
continental shelf of the Ross Dependency was found by the US research ship Glomar Challenger 
in 1973. It is more practical to extract minerals offshore because on the continent the immense 
ice sheet covering 98 per cent of the land is one mile think on average and moves seaward at a 
rate of one metre per day, making drilling unfeasible.2 The oceanic mining is also dangerous and 
logistically difficult. The icebergs that slough off Antarctica are much bigger and the waters 
much deeper than in the Arctic where some mining activity is undertaken.3  
 
                                                 
2 Liesbeth Peeters, Square Peg, Round Hole: Jurisdiction Over Minerals Mining Offshore 
Antarctica, MqJICEL (2004) Vol 1, 218. 
3 Barbara Mitchell, ‘Undermining Antarctica’, Technology Review, Boston, February 1988, 54. 
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Figure 1: Potential Mineral Resources in the Antarctic 
The ban imposed by the Antarctic Treaty also creates deterrence, as mining corporations 
do not want to run into the legal complications.4 ‘No corporation would even contemplate an 
investment of millions of pounds knowing that its work was resting on a legal quagmire.’5
 
C THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM  
 
1 Instruments 
i Antarctic Treaty Background 
International interest in Antarctica’s economic potential began in the 1970s. The 
Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961. It did not cover mineral resource protection or 
exploitation, mainly because the interests of the claimants and non-claimants were 
irreconcilable.6 The Treaty Parties foresaw that unregulated mining could cause serious 
environmental damage. They were all adamant that a cautious approach much be implemented 
for mineral extraction proposals. They wanted to put measures in place as interest first arose, on 
the basis that it would be easier to get consensus on regulation prior to discovery of minerals.7  
 
Despite the international cooperation, territorial claim dormancy, and goodwill which 
characterises international relations in Antarctica, even in times of intense international discord, 
                                                 
4 Suter, above n 1, 49. 
5 Suter, above n 1, 51. 
6 Peeters, above n 2, 219. 
7 Mining Issues in New Zealand,  Antarctica New Zealand Information Sheet 
www.antarcticanz.govt.nz/downloads/information/infosheets/mining.pdf  
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the legal predicament means there is potential for conflict in Antarctica. Avoidance of conflict is 
one of the main principles encoded in the Antarctic Treaty. The tangled legal issues are due to 
the unique condition of territorial claims in Antarctica, which in turn are due to the utter 
uniqueness of the region.  
 
Seven states have made claims, none of which are recognized by the rest of the 
International community. Two major presences on the continent, United States and Russia, have 
not made any claim, three claims overlap, and one segment is not claimed. 
 
Figure 2: Territorial Claim Segments in Antarctica 
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The legality of mining activity in the Antarctic marine environment centers closely 
around the international law governing the oceans. Depending on whether a claimant or non-
claimant State is arguing, interpretation of the law for the marine area may be very different. 
Claimant States contend that the oceans are subject to territorial, sovereign rights, while non-
claimant states argue that all of the area south of 60°S simply has high seas status, subject to 
none of the coastal state zones, rights and restrictions. Complex multilateral regimes are 
successfully negotiated however, for example resource regimes such as the Environmental 
Protocol in 1991 and the Seal Convention 1972, Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources 1980 (CCAMLR), and the failed Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities 1988 (CRAMRA). These skirt around the sovereignty 
issues, and treat the entire Treaty Area as one management area. These delicate balances are 
found throughout Antarctic law. 8  
 
The Fridtjof Nansen Foundation 
 
In 1973 the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation held a meeting to analyse the problems around 
mining in the Antarctic Treaty Area. The Foundation canvassed the three major schools of 
thought on the legality of mining.  Firstly, commercial exploration was in breach of the Treaty 
unless it was amended or new a regime was added. Secondly, as the Treaty neither expressly 
allowed or disallowed mining, actors needed Consultative members’ consent to be in compliance 
with the Treaty’s aims and objectives. The third approach was that as there was no prohibition in 
the treaty text, mining activity was not in breach if actions were within the bounds of the Treaty. 
Supporters of this view maintained that commercial activity was pursuing a peaceful purpose.9  
 
The potential for disharmony is created both in the assertion that mining is not possible 
under the Treaty at all, and in the assertion that unilateral freedom of mining is allowed. The 
avoidance of disharmony was the fundamental principle in drafting of the Antarctic Treaty and is 
stated in the preamble. Thus to act on either assertion is potentially in breach of the Treaty. 
Mining is not mentioned in the Treaty but to say this means mining can never be conducted 
                                                 
8 Davor Vidas, The Antarctic Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Miles in Protecting the Polar Marine 
Environment: Law and Policy Reform for Pollution Prevention David Vidas (ed) (Cambridge 
University Press) p266. 
9 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Antarctic Mineral Exploitation: The Emerging Legal Framework, 
(1988, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), 42. 
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denies the Treaty’s capacity to be dynamic. Vicuna continuously emphasises that the Treaty’s 
foundation is cooperation between States.10 Co-operation of interested states to build a strict 
mining regime appears to be the answer to achieving the harmonious international relations the 
Treaty drafters and current parties are supremely anxious to maintain. 
 
 
The Antarctic Treaty may fall within the category of a framework convention. These are 
treaties wherein fundamental objectives and mechanisms are laid out, and the legal intricacies 
are left to be developed by negotiations and actions of the members. Given the Antarctic 
Treaty’s characteristic capacity to adapt, there is a strong argument that fits this category. Thus, 
building a regime to accommodate and regulate mining is legally plausible. However, attempts to 
gain member state consensus are currently abandoned, as seen in the collapse of CRAMRA, and 
similarly in the United States reasons for not signing the Law of the Sea Convention. 
 
ii Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activity 1988 
(CRAMRA) 
 
CRAMRA was negotiated with the intent that it would become one of the instruments in 
the Antarctic Treaty System. Article 25 of the Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty required the 
development of a regime on the commencement of mining activity. CRAMRA was drafted 
between 1981 and 1988 by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. It was adopted in 1988. It 
did not receive the mandatory consensus, as Australia and France declined to sign the convention 
in 1989. CRAMRA was drafted with a view to ensuring environmental protection on the 
development of mining activity. It had radically strict environmental protections and 
management processes.11 Australia and France asserted that the controls were not adequate and 
that mining needed to be prohibited outright, reiterating their commitment to Antarctica being 
solely a nature reserve used and utilised for science.  
 
CRAMRA would have implemented revolutionary environmental protection restrictions, 
and it required consensus before any mining activity could be undertaken. It included inspection, 
                                                 
10Vicuna, above n 9, 43. 
11 Mining Issues in New Zealand,  Antarctica New Zealand Information Sheet 
www.antarcticanz.govt.nz/downloads/information/infosheets/mining.pdf  
Antarctica New Zealand, p 1. 
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monitoring, reporting, compulsory settlement of disputes, access to courts, and suspension of 
disputes causing unacceptable damage to the environment. It included the seabed and subsoil of 
adjacent offshore areas to Antarctica and the sub-Antarctic Islands below 60°S. It did not attempt 
to regulate the seabed beyond Antarctica’s geographically delineated continental shelf (Article 
5). The agreement negotiated and obtained consensus on a number of very controversial issues, 
and managed to produced regulations and environmental standards even though they encroached 
upon states’ autonomy, and gave rights to a CRAMRA Authority Body.12 If mining began in the 
absence of this convention, no legal framework would be in place. This would is contrary to 
Article 25 of the Environmental Protocol. 
 
iii The Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 (The Madrid Protocol) 
  
This environmental agreement primarily imposes duties on interested States. The drafting 
discussions that took place for CRAMRA drafting discussions were the first steps in the creation 
of the Environmental Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991.13 It 
was a comprehensive code for almost every kind of human activity and has been described as 
“the greening of Antarctic policy.”14 Article 7 imposes a ban on all mineral activities except for 
approved scientific research. 
 
The Protocol puts a 50 year ban without review on mining (Article 25). It utilises the 
precautionary principle, reflecting the Treaty members’ concern for the devastating effects future 
exploitation could wreck on the delicate environment. This provision requires the opposite 
conduct from that allowed by high seas freedoms and the Common Heritage status of the Deep 
Seabed. It imposes blanket prohibitions where the high seas rules grant rights to undertake 
activity. Scientific research is allowed by Antarctic Treaty members within the ATS Area 
without consent. If the research is related to drilling or mineral exploitation, or threatened the 
environment, the research freedoms will begin to encroach on the ban and precautions of the 
Environmental Protocol.15
  
                                                 
12 Christopher Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea (1992, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrect) 163.  
13 Antarctica New Zealand, above n 11, p 1. 
14 Peeters, above n 2, 217. 




2 Claimants’ Right to Claim Antarctica Under International Law  
 
Even if Antarctica was ever deemed eligible for sovereign ownership there still needs to 
be international recognition of the claim. The major legal criterion that can not be met is the 
presence of a permanent population. Also, the Antarctic Treaty System means that no one can act 
independently in the role of coastal soveriegn. Instead the unique circumstances are perfect for 
the creation of certain umbrella rules, such as environmental protection, or the failed CRAMRA 
provisions. The sub-Antarctic islands’ soveriegn claims are recognized by the international 
community. It is not clear that this automatically gives them Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf rights.16 This will become very important should significant mineral resources 
be discovered within these areas.17
 
One line of argument on Antarctica’s communal territory is that given that its freezing 
temperatures makes it uninhabitable, it cannot be claimed on the grounds of occupation but can 
only be exploited, and therefore ought to be open to all states to exploit. The counter argument is 
that Antarctica can theoretically be under state sovereignty as it can be acquired in ways other 
than traditional occupation and similar criteria. This is the theory that prevailed in international 
law. 18 The claims have not been resolved however, and the law is still not clear.19
 
Antarctica is far from fulfilling the criteria of statehood, which means it is denied 
offshore territorial limits which means high seas freedoms apply. Antarctica is not a continent 
with many coastal states, and neither is it a condominium, that is, a country governed by two or 
more different countries with joint responsibility. Therefore the international community does 
not recognise the right of interested parties to benefit from jurisdictional oceanic zoning.  
 
4 Claimants Rights Regarding the High Seas and the Deep Seabed 
 
                                                 
16 Christopher Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea (1992, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrect) 89.  
17 Joyner, above n 16, p 89. 
18 Vicuna, above n 9, p 7. 
19 Vicuna, above n 9, p 8. 
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The area south of 60°S Antarctic Treaty area has vast areas of high seas. The Treaty 
Parties cannot limit anyone else’s rights on these High Seas and this is reiterated in Article VI 
AT. The Treaty Parties have also chosen not to place limits on each others rights on the high 
seas. 
 
  The vagueness found in the Antarctic Treaty causes the uncertainty over the law in the 
Antarctic Oceans, and no doubt the legal complexity and conflicting state interests are the reason 
why the loose drafting is there. Where the high seas begin and end both vertically and 
horizontally is the crux of the controversy. Article VI sets the Antarctic Treaty System Area 
boundary at 60°S, including all ice shelves. However, it does not define what is actually 
encompassed by ‘the high seas’. In addition to this, the deep seabed, or “the Area” is a new 
consideration in international law, with unclear boundaries, international legal rights and 
restrictions. These factors are vitally important, because a State’s right to engage in mining 
activities  in the ocean floor depends entirely on the legal status of the seabed. 
 
The deep seabed and the associated Common Heritage of Mankind principle did not exist 
when the Antarctic Treaty was drafted in 1959. The reiteration of the High Seas rights in Article 
VI may include the deep seabed as an area generally ‘beyond national jurisdiction.’ The counter 
argument is that as the jurisdiction of the ISA and the CHM principle are not customary 
international law, due to opposition from the United States,  the deep seabed is not automatically 
included in high seas freedoms, which are reaffirmed by Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty, and 
exist as customary international law. 
 
The region is believed to be rich in coal, cobalt, gold, iron, manganese, nickel, platinum, 
silver, tin, and uranium. The resources that raise the most interest are the potential oil and gas 
fields within the continental shelf. US Government report estimated that the Weddell Sea alone 
could contain as much as 45 billion barrels of oil and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.20 
Antarctica’s shelf might be considered legally analogous to the shelf area beyond 200 nautical 
miles. Under UNCLOS, the exploiting state would thus be liable for payments and contributions 
to the Authority.21 The abyssal plains surrounding Antarctica are potentially rich in manganese 
nodule deposits. Under Part IV of UNCLOS these areas are the ‘common heritage of mankind’ 
                                                 
20 Christopher Joyner, Antarctica and Law of the Sea: New Resources vs. Legal Dilemmas (1982 
IEEE Washington D.C.) 1212. 
21 Joyner above n 20, 1212. 
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and come under the International Seabed Authority’s jurisdiction. This will be discussed below. 
The Antarctic claimant states do not claim rights over the high seas, but they may claim rights 
over the seabed, especially if it proves to be within their economic interests.22 This is contrary to 
Part IV of UNCLOS. 
 
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty reiterates the high seas rights. Given that the 
international community does not recognise the state claims, this Article may serve to weaken 
the argument that marine areas may be subject to the claimant’s states’ jurisdiction. Even if the 
seabed around Antarctica is deemed to be high seas, and thus not under any sovereign 
restrictions, under the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and likewise under customary 
international law, mining is not a high seas right. Mining could remain prohibited while high 
seas freedoms of inter alias navigation and over flight are not affected. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty System texts are ambiguous and vague around points of law that are 
salient for the determining the legality of mining. Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty says the 
Treaty cannot prejudice or affect States’ rights under high seas international law. Neither the 
Treaty nor the Protocol contain any definition of which parts of the Antarctic Treaty area are the 
high seas. This ambiguity is the basis of potential disputes over mining rights in Antarctic 
waters. This is the interface whereat the Antarctic Treaty system and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) begin to interact. The Madrid Protocol 1991, and 
its Annex IV on protection from marine pollution, do not mention the LOS Convention, which 
regulates all ocean space, despite many consultative parties of the Antarctic Treaty being 
signatories of UNCLOS. 
 
C THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982 
(UNCLOS) 
 
Some commentators have questioned whether UNCLOS can be applied in Antarctica. 
Others maintain that the Antarctic Treaty cannot apply to the surrounding seabed. Joyner writes 
that UNCLOS has contemporary relevance for all ocean space. The Antarctic Treaty regime’s 
legal status is accepted by the international community. It makes the members joint 
administrators of activities on and around the continent, they manage and protect the area for the 
                                                 
22 Joyner, above n 20, 1213.   
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good of all mankind. On the face of it, the UN Convention aims to include all the world’s 
oceans. The preamble states that UNCLOS deals with all issues covering the entire ocean space. 
However, the unique geographical and political environmental in Antarctica makes application 
of the Convention so difficult that there are strong arguments for the Antarctic being separate 
from the general LOS provisions. 
 
In the 1980s the attention of the international community was drawn to the possibility 
that Antarctica contained vast hydrocarbon deposits on the continental shelf. Leading Antarctic 
legal commentator Chris Joyner was writing at the time the UNCLOS provisions were being 
drafted, and CRAMRA discussions were beginning. The UNCLOS drafters did not have 
Antarctic area at the forefront of their minds while drafting this law, as they were focusing on 
more typical areas in which more states had interests. ‘if the [UNCLOS Draft Convention] goes 
into force it would produce some intriguing and perhaps even entangling legal ramifications for 
governments interested in the [Antarctic] region.’23  
 
UNCLOS potentially includes the polar regions in its ambit expressly in several articles. 
Article 234 of the Convention specifically protects ice-covered areas from pollution from 
vessels. This must have been intended specifically for the polar oceans. The provision was 
negotiated between member States with interests in the Arctic. Some commentators argue that 
this specific inclusion of polar ocean illustrates the all-inclusive global character of the 
Convention.24 However, this provision is nick-named ‘the Arctic Article’ and was not drafted 
with the Antarctic in mind.25 This special mention of the polar environment in relation to 
pollution may also be an indication that these ‘ice covered’ areas are not intended to be included 
elsewhere in the agreement, as gaining consensus on issues in the region are left in the too-hard 
basket as they delve into jurisdictional complexities that UNCLOS is anxious to avoid. 
 
                                                 
23 Joyner, above n 20, p 1211. 
24 M. H. Nordquist (editor in chief) with S. Rosenne and A. Yankov (eds.) United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, A commentary, Vol IV (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1991), p39. 
25 Budislav Vukas, The LOS Convention and the Polar Marine Environment in Implementing the 
Environmental Protocol Regime for the Antarctic, Davor Vidas (ed) (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers) p 37. 
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At the 1975 UN General Assembly, the President Hamilton Shirley Amerasinge declared 
that the status of Antarctica was not linked to the UNCLOS Conference issues.26 This was not to 
exclude Antarctica’s oceans from the ambit of UNCLOS, but it would not decide on where the 
different zone boundaries lay, or if they legally existed at all. The special rights given to coastal 
states around the Arctic in Article 234 are not easily transposed into the Antarctic as the 
sovereignty of the Coastal States in the Antarctic is not recognised by the rest of the world. The 
Artic is technically high seas surrounded by clear coastal state territories, the Antarctic is 
technically unclear state territories surrounded by the high seas. The unclear sovereignty issues 
are what the UNCLOS Conference refuses to become involve in. 
 
The leading Antarctic legal commentators name Articles 194 and 197 as evidence of 
UNCLOS intention to bind activity in the Antarctic. Article 194(5) is about the environmental 
protection and preservation of rare or fragile ecosystems. As this undoubtedly describes 
Antarctic ecosystems it imposes a direct duty to protect Antarctic oceans from pollution.27 
Article 197 imposes duties on States to co-operate globally and regionally. Despite the 
ambiguities over the word ‘region’, it is undisputed that Antarctica is a region, thus imposing a 
duty to directly, or by means of an ‘appropriate regional organization’, coordinate activities 
relating to navigation, pollution, and exploitation and conservation of endangered living 
resources. This may be seen as already achieved.  The states which co-operate very successfully 
within the Antarctic Treaty System may be the ‘appropriate regional organisation’, and thus 
appear authorised by the UNCLOS text to coordinate activities. The system possibly thus 
prevails as lex specialis.  
 
Lex Specialis And Lex Generalis  
 
As UNCLOS does not clearly describe its interaction with other international agreements 
and norms, many legal rules for deciding the prevalence of Treaties are difficult to apply. Article 
237(1) stipulates that specific obligations under special agreements relating to the protection of 
the marine environment, made by states previously or in the future, are not prejudiced by the 
provisions in Part XII of UNCLOS. This is known as a lex specialis. This means that UNCLOS 
is acting as an overarching framework agreement, lex generalis, and there are agreements with 
                                                 
26 Amerasinghe, 30th General Assembly Official Records, 2380th meeting, 1975, Para 36. 
27 Vukas, above n 25, p 42. 
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smaller scopes relating to specific areas or concerns. Usually this would mean that the lex 
specialis Treaty would prevail.  
 
Article 197 requires all future international rules to be consistent with the Convention, 
and Article 237(2) requires specific obligations under special conventions to be consistent with 
the general principles and objectives of the Convention. These seem to be a contradiction of the 
Article 237(1) lex specialis, which says the Convention does not prejudice special agreements on 
environmental protection. The importance of this point of law is that the Environmental Protocol 
to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 is, by some interpretations, inconsistent with the Convention in its 
mining ban, because the Convention allows exploration. 
 
The relationship between the Antarctic Treaty and UNCLOS is complicated. The 
positions are potentially incompatible. Classifying the Madrid Protocol as lex specialis  gives it  
prevalence over UNCLOS in the Antarctic Treaty Area, given its specific Antarctic focus. 
However, this argument is criticized as being too simplistic, and the policy-based counter 
argument is that if this rule is applied in this situation, it would mean it could be used in many 
others also, and the line should be drawn well before this situation.28  
 
 
Special ‘regional’ customary international law for the Antarctic area among the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties is not unreasonable.29 UNCLOS provisions were drafted on the 
assumption that coastal states activities, powers, rights and obligations will be in operation. 
Because there are no internationally recognised coastal states in Antarctica, the international law 
must be applied mutatis mutandis, that is, with modification to suit the unique set of facts. A 
logical and practicable solution would be that activities on the sea bed off the coast of Antarctica 
should be decided by a set of rules made by all the interested states under joint obligations as a 
de facto coastal state.30 In attempting to create CRAMRA the ATCP are acting legally like a 
state would within its EEZ, effectively creating an EEZ around Antarctica with joint regulations 
and regulatory bodies and similar soveriegn functions.  The importance of co-operation is 
reiterated by Vicuna who asserted that active co-operation is needed if mining activities are 
                                                 
28 Sahurie, above n p 375. 
29 Joyner, above n 12, p126. 
30 Vukas above n 25, p 51. 
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going to commence, not passive.31 Thus there is a need for the Consultative Parties to work 




1 The Antarctic Treaty and UNCLOS: The Madrid Protocol’s Ambit 
 
The question that now arises is whether the Madrid Protocol includes the deep seabed in 
its ambit. Article 7 of the Protocol bans mining, but the Protocol does not give specific 
boundaries for the ban. The seabed within the 60°S Antarctic Treaty Area may be subject to the 
Law of the Sea Convention, which permits mineral development.32 This is because the deep 
seabed is recent area of interest in international law, and the international community does not 
yet have solidified legal rules relating to it. The seabed does not automatically get treated the 
same as the water column above it.  
 
2 The Land verses Sea Distinction 
 
CRAMRA and the Protocol appear to be drafted with the terrestrial areas of Antarctica at 
the forefront of the drafters’ minds. However, both instruments do provide for the inclusion of 
the oceans within their ambits, thus the distinction is not market enough to argue that the drafters 
could not have intended the marine areas to be included. In CRAMRA Article 5, under ‘Area of 
Application’, the agreement expressly includes ‘in the seabed and subsoil of adjacent offshore 
areas up to the deep seabed.’ As the existence of a marine space that is not legally “deep 
seabed”, given the absence of legal Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Zones, 
CRAMRA’s attempt to cover the marine environment may be obsolete. The legal status of the 
adjacent offshore areas is discussed below. Article (1)15 of CRAMRA also expressly includes 
marine damage in its environmental considerations. Article 2 is about protection ‘the Antarctic 
environment and dependent associated ecosystems.’ This impliedly includes the oceans, as there 
is nothing else but marine environment outside what is inherently terrestrial Antarctica, so the 
concept of ‘associated ecosystems’ would be redundant if it did not intend to cover the Antarctic 
oceans.  
                                                 
31 Vicuna, above n 9, p 23. 
32 F Francioni, ‘Introduction: A Decade of Development in Antarctica Law’ in F Francioni and T 
Scovanzzi (eds), International Law for Antarctica (1996) 3. 
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 Other instruments within the Antarctic Treaty System appear to safeguard the environment 
with emphasis on the terrestrial environment. The most important example of this is the 
Environmental Protocol, which contains the ban on mining. Practical implementation of this 
instrument by Treaty members is generally critcised focusing almost exclusively on the 
terrestrial environment, as it has seldom been utilised for protecting the marine environment 
unconnected to associated land protections. However, the Protocol provisions, like CRAMRA, 
expressly aim to protected Antarctic and the associated ecosystems, which must include the 
marine environment, especially the adjacent waters within 60°S.  
 
The “Ecosystem Approach” revolutionized by the Madrid Protocol imposes a protection 
based approach on resource management. The mandate is to protect the Antarctic environment 
and dependent and associated ecosystems. This must mean the surrounding ocean areas, as they 
are intricately associated, if not definitively part of, the Antarctic environment. This is a clear 
argument in support of the inclusion of the deep seabed in the Madrid Protocol’s mandate.33
  
If it could be concluded that Antarctic Treaty System did intend to include offshore areas 
in its mining ban, the interaction with UNCLOS begins. The legal web around the world’s 
oceans is set out legally in a ‘freedom-commons-sovereignty trichotomy.’ 34 This refers to the 
freedom of the high seas, the deep seabed as common heritage, and sovereignty over land and 
certain coastal zones. Antarctica’s atypical political and legal environment mean it cannot be 
neatly caught in the trichotomy framework. 
 
UNCLOS pollution standards 
 
Due to the absence of sovereign coastal states in Antarctica, the standard measures for 
enforcement of pollution are jeopardized. Drastic and specific rules would be required to 
overhaul the current system. These two main measures are enforcement by port states (Article 
                                                 
33 Peeters, above n 2, 222.  
34 Sahurie, above n 4, 483. 
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218) and enforcement by coastal states (Article 220), both dependent on territorial soveriegn 
rights. ‘Only the least efficient solution of enforcement by flag states (Article 217) – remains 
uncontroversial.’35 However, it is difficult to ensure the states the ships are flagged to are 




3 The Continental Shelf: Legal Complexities  
 
The continental margin is estimated to consist of one fifth of the ocean floor, but has 
disproportionately high commercial value in the resources it contains. The continental margin 
sediments contain minerals. The most important mineral resources to be exploited from 
continental margins are oil and gas reserves. ‘Geologically rapid, pressurized sedimentation 
along margins, combined with high geothermal activity, source rock strata, and reservoir rock 
formation to create hydrocarbon deposits are sufficiently available in offshore regions.’36 The 
presence of such reserves in Antarctica is not yet scientifically proven but geological, 
sedimentological and geomorphological studies suggests that it is highly likely. 37
 
The continental shelf is defined in Article 76 of UNCLOS as the seabed and subsoil. 
Thus the airspace and waters above the sea floor are not included and the attached high seas 
freedoms of navigation and over flight are not affected.38 The high seas rights only encompasses 
the water column, the seabed is not considered to be part of the state’s sovereign territory.39  
 
The continental shelf lies between the territorial sea and the deep seabed. It is highly 
contentious whether Antarctica should have a continental shelf in terms of the legal rights 
afforded. In the hypothetical and extraordinary event of the claimant states succeeding in their 
claims, Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty which “freezes” the claims would need to be amended 
or removed. In this event, non claimant states would argue that the right to adjacent waters is not 
                                                 
35 Vukas above n 25, p 56. 
36 Joyner, above n, p111. 
37 Joyner, above n 12, p112 
38 Peeters, above n 2 , p 225.  
39 Joyner, above n 12, p121. 
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inherent with sovereignty over land. They would maintain that because no offshore jurisdiction 
claim was established by any state at the time the Antarctic Treaty came into force, making 
claims for adjacent waters is in breach of the Article IV prohibition on the creation or 
enlargement of the claims. UNCLOS appears to prevent claimants from claiming continental 
shelves under Article 121(3) which states that rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf. It is unlikely this was drafted 
with the Antarctic in mind however, and may not mutatis mutandus may be the more logical 
application of international law.  
 
Claimant nations would argue that claiming adjacent waters is inherent in their existing 
sovereignty rights and is not creating new, or enlarging existing, claims.40  This would give the 
state the right to exclusively explore and exploit resources found there under Article 77 of 
UNCLOS, and the area would be protected from international global commons freedoms as the 
sovereign state could impose restrictions. This is principally an argument about continental shelf 
claims, and claimant states asserting that the 200 nautical miles which legally represent their 
continental shelf are inherent in their territorial claims.  
 
The Truman Declaration in 1945 was the US unilaterally proclaiming the right to exploit 
the continental shelf zone beyond their territorial zones. This was quickly followed by other 
coastal states, and was customary international law by the early 1950s and certainly by the time 
the 1959 Treaty froze the Antarctic territorial claims. 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
judgment the ICJ declares that the Convention on the Continental Shelf have solidified into CIL 
and thus bound non-members of the Convention. Disputes over the outward boundary of the 
continental shelf rights led to the First UN Conference on the LOS in Geneva 1958. Thus 
customary and treaty law suggest that, should the claims ever be resolved, there is a high 
probability that the continental shelf will be included inherently. 
 
It is a task beyond the limits of this paper to ascertain whether the claimant states have a 
strong argument in claiming the continental shelves off their claimant sectors, however, there are 
some legal rules which would be used to decide on rights of ownership. Article 77(3) of 
UNCLOS states that the rights to the continental shelf do not depend on occupation or an express 
proclamation. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty prohibits new claims and enlargements, but also 
                                                 
40 Peeters, above n 2, p 222. 
 18
protects existing claims, and the continental shelf, under UNCLOS Article 77 is treated as a 
prolongation of the landmass. This is codification of the customary international law made in the 
1940s and 1950s. It is likely that the continental shelf would be treated as an inherent right of the 
sovereign state, and Peeters foresees a breakdown of the Antarctic Treaty system if these rights 
are not afforded, ‘to place the shelf under international control as a commons …could result in 
unilateral actions [by claimant States], thus endangering the valuable achievements of the 
ATS’.41
 
 Continental shelves are recognised as inherent, but in the ‘classical ‘Law of the Sea-
concepts’ nothing prevents the ISA from having authority over the seabed up to the shores in the 
unclaimed sector’42
 
4 The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
 
While mostly States are content to let sleeping dogs lie on most ownership issues in the 
Antarctic, there is a sense of urgency on this matter of the legality of the Antarctic continental 
shelf because of an approaching deadline under UNCLOS. The Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf was set up under Annex II to the LOS Convention has a provision for 
submission of scientific evidence to back up claims “where a coastal State intends to establish 
the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.” Annex II imposes a dead line 
of 10 years after ratification. Antarctic claimants dealt with this in different ways, trying to 
reconcile their obligations under the Antarctic Treaty not to extend their claims, with asserting 
their rights under UNCLOS to explore and exploit a larger marine area.43
 
When applied to the unique Antarctic circumstances the law becomes a tangle of rules 
which again were not developed with Antarctic conditions in mind. These are the UNCLOS time 
constraints, the dormant Antarctic claims, the obligation not to extend the claims, and the rest of 
the world’s refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the claims. The clashing of the two treaties 
resulted in international outcry at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. This was in 
response to Australia, which was the first Antarctic claimant to approach this ten year deadline. 
The Australian government made a public announcement that it would be funding the defining of 
                                                 
41 Peeters, above n 2, p 225. 
42 Peeters, above n 2, 227. 
43 Vidas, above n 15, p 266. 
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the limits of the shelf within the Australian’s segment of claim. In 2004 the information was 
submitted to the Continental Shelf Commission as conditional, with a diplomatic note 
accompanying the submission asking the Commission not to examine the Antarctic scientific 
content. Eight nations were provoked to respond, the United States declared it was a breach of 
the ‘the harmony and continuing peaceful cooperation, security and stability of the Antarctic 
Area.’44 New Zealand dealt with the same issue presenting their report to the Commission 
excluding scientific evidence on their Antarctic claim, but reserving the right to make a claim in 
the future.  
 
UNCLOS deliberately refrained from dealing with the effect of the unique natural 
features on the legal boundary delimitation, in order to side step the issues of sovereignty which 
are raised, for example, over the miles of permanent ice shelf skirting the coastline.45 Nandan 
and Rosenne emphasize that the LOS Commission ‘is not to be involved in any matters 
regarding the determination … of a coastal State’s continental shelf where there is a dispute with 
another State over that limit.’46 The Convention cannot be used to strengthen claims of the 
existence of territorial zones and rights. The Commission’s Rules do provide for a postponement 
of delimitation where areas are under dispute.  
 
5 The International Seabed Authority 
 
As previously mentioned, the deep seabed, or ‘the Area’, is a new focus in international 
law. Law concerning it is included in UNCLOS, but it was subject to much controversy. Much of 
this arises from Article 136 which gives the Area and its resources the status of the “common 
heritage of mankind.” This is reiterated by Article 140(1) which require activities to be carried 
out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, with particular consideration to developing states.  
The mining regime in the Protocol conflicts with the Deep Seabed mining provisions in Part XI 
of UNCLOS in the Antarctic Treaty Area. The Protocol imposes a complete ban, UNCLOS 
allows activity if it is environmentally aware and the benefits are equitably shared. UNCLOS III 
sets up the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which licenses and regulates mineral resource 
activity.  
                                                 
44 Ruth Davis, Commentaries: Enforcing Australian Law in Antarctica: The HIS Legislation, 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2007, Vol 8, p11. 
45 Vidas, above n 15, p 269. 
46 Nandan and Rosenne, A Commentary, p1,017.  
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The role of the ISA potentially clashes with the Antarctic Treaty System role as 
regulators of activity in the Antarctic. Under Article 137(2) the minerals recovered from the Area 
may only be alienated in accordance with this part and the rules, regulations and procedures of 
the Authority. The ISA is to be responsible for equitable sharing of financial and other benefits, 
under Article 140(2), and for the protection of the marine environment, ‘the Authority shall 
adopt appropriate rules for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other hazards to 
the marine environment’ under Article 145. Furthermore, Article 137(3) provides that no State or 
natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights with respect to the minerals 
recovered for  the Area, except in accordance with this Part. This effectively puts all powers into 
the hands of the ISA. 
 
As discussed above, given the very shaky status of the sovereignty claims, Antarctica 
cannot be said to have continental shelf rights. Thus the shelf circling the continent is treated by 
the law as deep seabed. There is currently no regime for the deep seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction. The US and most developed states categorise mineral activity on the deep sea bed as 
a high seas freedom, as res communis. Developing states argue that the resources in the deep 
seabed should be treated consistently with the two UN resolutions which declare that the deep 
seabed is the Common Heritage of Mankind and calls for a moratorium on exploitation of the 
resources. It alternatively treats the Area as res communis and thus under the regulations of the 
International Seabed Authority. The developing states say that prior to 1970 there was no 
international law on the deep seabed and that it is still developing, and thus must take the UN’s 
approach into account.47 However, while the majority of UNCLOS is recognised by the 
international community, the law for the deep seabed is not, and the Common Heritage of 
Mankind is also not accepted as a legally binding principle by most developed nations. 
 
Under the UNCLOS 1982 regime Antarctic shelf and sea floor minerals would be run by 
the International Seabed Authority. The Antarctic claimant members would have no sovereignty 
rights and the Antarctic Treaty members would have no duties or rights to protect, govern, 
enforce, regulate or benefit. The Common Heritage of Mankind concept means that no 
commercial profit or private gain could be taken from the area, as it must benefit the whole of 
mankind. A less stringent interpretation of the common heritage concept is that private benefit 
                                                 
47 Joyner, above n 12, p127. 
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could be derived, but that a levy would be paid to an international body to ensure equitable 
distribution of the resource.48  
 
The Secretary General of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) explained in his 
statement to the United Nations in December 2007 that the 1982 Convention and the 
International Seabed Authority was set up in anticipation of seabed mining, despite the 
subsequent twenty five year absence of seabed mining development since the signing. ‘At this 
moment, the day when commercial mining of seabed resources becomes a reality is closer than 
at any time in the past 25 years.’49 The current international environment has high demands for 
those minerals that are found abundantly in the seabed, owing largely to China, India and 
Brazil’s considerable new economic growth. The private sector has target dates for exploration 
and exploitation and is active in its anticipation of beginning mining activities from the deep 
seabed. The forefront of the planning is focused on the Western Pacific.50  
 
Nandan does not view the unforeseen time lapse as a negative. The ISA says the luxury 
of time is attributable to the greater scientific understanding of the deep seabed, the international 
understanding and cooperation based on free market principles, development of a legal regime, 
which, importantly, emphasises the use of the precautionary approach and imposes rigorous 
environmental standards.  
  
Nandan explains that the environmental protections are focused on responses to 
environmental degradation, after the damage is done, usually due to over-exploitation of 
resources and the resulting destruction of surrounding ecosystems. The need to set aside areas to 
preserve flora and fauna is entrenched in UNCLOS, 162(2)(x) gives the council of the Authority 
the power to ‘disapprove areas for exploitation where substantial evidence indicates the risk of 
serious harm to the marine environment.’ Under UNCLOS Part III states are obliged to take 
measures under UNCLOS III to consider their impacts on the marine environment. While this is 
a reflection of the environmental movement which has been gathering momentum through the 
second half of the 20th century, the Convention’s approach to environmental protection not as 
strict as the protection put in place by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Members to  preserve 
                                                 
48 Joyner, above n 12, p128. 
49 Satya N. Nandan, Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, Statemetn at 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 62nd session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 10 
December 2007, New York, p 2. 
50 Nanden, above n 49, 2. 
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the delicate and pristine environmental of Antarctica. The current ban on mining found in the 







6 The Common Heritage of Mankind 
 
Since the 1970s the concept of Common Heritage of Mankind has generated a lot of 
discussion. It is still unclear what the legal status of the concept is. 51 Areas of Common Heritage 
of Mankind (CHM) can not be owned by anybody, whether national, corporate, public or  
private, but are managed by everybody. No sovereign jurisdictional rights would exist and no 
state sovereign enforcement body would operate. Governments would be expected the aid in the 
management on behalf of all mankind, without national agendas. Economic benefits would be 
shared internationally, and, unless benefiting all mankind, commercial benefit or private gain 
would be inappropriate. It is an area for peaceful purposes. A CHM regime would ensure this. 
Scientific research is to be carried out freely for the benefit of mankind not for individual 
governments, so long as it does not harm the area physically or ecologically. 
 
CHM is neither res nullius, unowned property open to sovereign claims, nor res 
communis, property that cannot be owned and is thus open to the exploitation by anybody. CHM 
is non-proprietary, and a legal right would be created to give access to, and use of, space, not 
ownership of it. An international administrative agency would be responsible for developing, 
regulating and enforcing activity in the region. This allows the application of the cooperative de 
facto state made up of the Antarctic Treaty Parties to fulfill this role. This kind of management is 
wholly unique, in that noone would hold legal title, or have sovereign rights.  
 
Joyner says article CHM that the interests of all mankind are greater than the sum of all 
States’ national interests. Heritage suggests the importance of intergenerational equity, 52  
                                                 
51 Joyner, above n 12, 91. 
52 Joyner, Chris, Legal Implication of the Common Heritage of Mankind, The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 35:1 (Jan 1986) p 199. 
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In legal terms, the concept of “common heritage” would require that serious scrutiny be given to every 
activity in the area in order to prevent resource waste and to preclude environmental abuse. To fail in the protection, 
conservation, preservation and prudential management of the region and its resources would breach the trust and 
legal obligation implicit in responsibly supervising the earth’s heritage for mankind in the future.’  
 
These are the kind of considerations that are given weight in the Antarctic Treaty System. 
The CHM concept is applicable to the area, although the Treaty Systems requires stronger 
ecological protections even than this emerging norm requires. CHM has been given limited 
theoretical consideration in Antarctica. Part XI UNCLOS encodes CHM for the deep seabed as 
discussed above. The ISA is the embodiment of the international entity that regulates and mines 
the deep sea bed (Articles 156 – 185).53  
 
Article XI(1) of the Moon Treaty 1984 states that ‘the moon and its natural resources are 
the CHM’. It prohibits ownership, appropriation or sovereignty claim and says the resources are 
to be equitably distributed, and that exploration would need an international regime. I suggest 
that the Antarctic Treaty System, already accustomed to cooperating, is the perfect 
intergovernmental entity to undertake such a task in Antarctica. Joyner writes that the essence of 
CHM cogently expressed in Article VI(1),54 “the exploration of the moon shall be the province 
of all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or good scientific development.”   
 
In the 1980s the application of CHM to Antarctica was discussed. Malaysia was a strong 
advocate for CHM status applying in the region. In the  27th United Nations General Assembly 
session in 1982 the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mohammed Mahathir, said regarding Antarctica 
that ‘those uninhabited lands belong to the international community. The countries claiming 
them must give them up so that either the United Nations administer these lands or the present 
occupants act as trustees for the nations of the world.55
 
However, while there have been several decades full of discussions and academic writing 
on the concept of CHM, and “the Moon Treaty” and 1982 UNCLOS have incorporated the 
phrase into their texts, the concept is not an undisputed principle of customary international law. 
                                                 
53 Joyner, above n 52, p 196. 
54 Joyner above n 52 p 197. 
55 UN Doc. A/37/PV, pp 17 – 18 (29 Sept 1982). 
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Three limbs must first be satisfied for a concept to gain this status. Firstly, it must be very 
distinct and well defined. Secondly, the actions of the international community must reflect their 
acceptance of the concept, through State practice and opinio juris, which is belief that they are 
legally bound. Thirdly, State conduct must be clear enough and sufficiently broad-based to prove 
wide-spread acceptance of a new principle of law. CHM has failed to be treated as a legal 
principle in State practice, and Joyner cannot see its solidification occurring in the foreseeable 
future. ‘It is merely a philosophical notion with the potential to emerge and crystallize as a legal 
norm.’56
 
D Non-members of UNCLOS: Rights and Restrictions Under Customary International
 Law  
 
A number of important maritime states are not bound by the LOS Convention, including 
three Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty. These are Ecuador, Peru and Denmark. The 
United States was heavily involved in the drafting on UNCLOS, but did not become a signatory. 
The rights of a third party to UNCLOS in the event of mining activity in the Antarctic is a 
complex and hazy legal quagmire, raising issues of customary law, controversial emerging 
principles, and imperfect enforcement regimes. 
 
The extent to which a non-member state can be held responsible for its actions which 
would be a breach of the Treaty they are not a party to, depends on the existence of customary 
international law which may bind them. Treaty law not only codifies existing customary 
international law, but it is now used as evidence of emerging customary international law. The 
norm requires very broad acceptance by the international community, and must ‘include States 
whose interests are specially affected.’57 Thus an influential coastal state must recognise the 
existence of a customary international law rule before it can be really considered such, even if 
every other smaller coastal national believes it to be binding.  
 
These rules can be applied to UNCLOS to explore the possibility of its provisions being 
customary international law. The norm creating character of much of the UNCLOS, and the 
confirmation of the norm in many other treaties, and at the 1972 Conference on the Human 
                                                 
56 Joyner, above n 52, p 199. 
57 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), judgment, ICL Reports 1982, p 43, para 
74. 
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Environment and the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) has 
places these provisions fairly solidly in the realm of customary international law and not treaty 
law alone. For the purposes of this paper, a states’ obligation to preserve and protect the marine 
environment is the relevant norm in question. This is a recurring theme, emphasised in Principle 
2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. The Rio Conference was part 
of a wave of understanding in the second half of the twentieth century that humankind are having 
an unsustainable and devastating effect on the planet. Thus, under this international 
environmental law principle, States have the right to exploit the resources within their 
jurisdiction. This is subject to an obligation to pass national laws on environmental protection 





The complex interplay between the international treaties, the international bodies and the 
international law principles leaves this paper at its close almost as far from possessing real 
answers as it was at  its commencement. The delicate balance maintained by the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties allows a degree of co-operation and de facto sovereignty that is 
unprecedented elsewhere in the world. In the event of lucrative minerals being discovered, all 
interested parties will canvass their arguments along the complex and conflicting lines that are 
discussed above. The failure of CRAMRA is potentially only temporary. That regime, or a 
similar one, is required in law by the Antarctic Treaty under the Protocol, or alternately the ISA 
could potentially step in and override the Antarctic Treaty System under the authority of 
UNCLOS. The difficulties of the commencement of mining activities by third parties to 
UNCLOS and the Antarctic Treaty promises further tensions. Without the mammoth 
development of a regime with the binding strength of customary international law, the peaceful 

















INFORMATION PAPER TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE PARTIES 
 
AIM: to arm the ATCM with a brief summary of the legal rights of interested parties should 
mining activity commence in the Antarctic marine area. 
 
UNCLOS and Antarctic Treaty member non-claimant States 
 
The Antarctic Treaty members will want to retain some rights over the sea floor in order to 
regulate mining, for their own economic interests, for the preservation of harmonious 
international relations, and for the protection of the natural environment. The international 
community recognises the Antarctic Treaty System and the legitimacy of it regulatory and 
protective role in the region.  
 
There is contention over whether the Article 7 mining ban extends into the marine 
environment, however the inclusive wording in the Environmental Protocol suggests that ATCPs 
have a least a role in protecting the marine environment from damage caused by mining activity. 
They also have a duty to construct a regime, such as CRAMRA to regulate any mining activity. 
They would claim they had a right to form a  co-operative ‘joint EEZ’. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty imposes the duty to preserve the high seas freedoms (Article VI). 
Legal issues around the deep seabed developed after the drafting of the Treaty. However, as the 
Antarctic is a global commons, the deep seabed may be treated as high seas I that it is ‘beyond 
areas of national jurisdiction.’ The ATCPs would benefit from gaining authority from the ISA to 
be care takers for the region in its capacity as the common heritage of man kind.  
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These states are likely to retain the right to protect the Antarctic environment, and 
potentially the ATS may be given lex specialis status so that it can function within UNCLOS 
according to its own specific Antarctic provisions. It is unlikely they will gain any legal 
economic benefits, as the area is either free for all, under the high seas regime, or common 
heritage of mankind, under the deep seabed regime, in which case benefits would be equitably 
distributed to all mankind, in the form of levies.  
 
UNCLOS and Antarctic Treaty member claimant States 
 
All of the Antarctic claimant states are members of UNCLOS. Claimant states are going to 
want to safeguard their interests in the adjacent marine environment, especially in the event of 
mineral discovery in the sea floor. The status of this area is controversial as the international 
community does not recognise the territorial claim. Claimant states were given special inclusion 
in the management of their claims under the CRAMRA regime, and if a similar regime was 
resurrected in the future under Article 25 of the Protocol they may have the rights to regulate 
such activity, for example, to protect the environment. The main contention is whether the 
coastal waters have continental shelf status. While UNCLOS and customary international treat 
the continental shelf right as inherent in territorial rights, the doubtful status of the terrestrial 
claims mean claimant states are unlikely to derive continental shelf rights from the adjacent 
seabed. It is likely it will have high seas freedoms status come under the mandate of the 
International Seabed Authority.  
 
UNCLOS member, non-Antarctic Treaty member States 
 
UNCLOS members who are not signatories of the Antarctic Treaty will deny the 
possibility of any law of the sea zoning regimes being present in the Antarctic Treaty area.  
They will assert its status as a global commons. They are subject to environmental 
obligations with relation to mining in the Antarctic. They must prevent or take measures to 
improve pollution, they must not destroy delicate marine ecosystems. As signatories to 
UNCLOS they adhere to the legal principle that the seabed in the common heritage of 
mankind, and must therefore comply with the regulations put in place by the ISA. The ISA 
could potentially impose a complete ban on mining in the Southern Ocean, which would 
have a wider reaching effect than the Antarctic Environmental Protocol ban. There is 
considerable political pressure even on non-member states to abide by the Environmental 
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standards of the Antarctic Treaty. The legally binding UNCLOS standards are not as 





Non-Antarctic Treaty member, Non-UNCLOS member States 
 
This category of international players will oppose the claimant states right to derive 
extra economic or management benefits from their “frozen” claims. They are bound only 
by those points of law that are customary international law. Thus, the common heritage of 
mankind principle does not apply, as the United States refused to sign UNCLOS partially 
because of this provision. Thus, the Antarctic is effectively a global commons, with no 
obligation to ensure equitable distribution to all mankind. The duty to protect the 
environment is customary law, however, and this consideration is the only deterrence from 
such a player mining in any art of the marine area in the Antarctic. It is a vague rule 
however, which does not require  active measure to be taken, and without adequate 
enforcement mechanisms. It is arguable that mining is not a high seas freedom. 
 
Non-claimant, Non-UNCLOS member States 
 
A pertinent example of a State in this category is the influential coastal state and 
Antarctic Treaty member, the United States. Their rights and obligations are similar to 
those above, although they are legally bound by the strict environmental standards, and the 
duty to remain co-operative and peaceful within the Antarctic Treaty Area. The vagueness 
of the Antarctic Treaty text however may allow mining activity, especially is a state could 
establish that the seabed was not included in the Madrid Protocol ban, given that 
CRAMRA expressly stated it did not cover the deep seabed, and the Madrid Protocol 
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